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PRESERVING THE ESSENTIAL ROLE
OF THE SUPREME COURT:
A COMMENT ON JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S PROPOSAL
ARTHUR

D.

HELLMAN*

Unresolved conflicting decisions of the federal courts of appeals are often cited as a compelling reason for the creation of a
new national appellate court. In this Response to Justice Rehnquist's Article, Professor Hellman challenges the assertion that
these conflicts are a major problem for the judiciary and the bar.
He then discusses the perceived need for more national decisionmaking capacity, and disagrees with Justice Rehnquist's denial
of the value of the "percolation"of issues in the courts of appeals. He argues that the Supreme Court's role in deciding statutory construction issues is an important influence on the internal dynamics of the Court and for public acceptance of the
concept of judicial review. Professor Hellman concludes that a
new national appellate court would represent a major restructuring of the federal judiciary to meet a need that so far has not
been demonstrated.

I.

INTRODUCTION

W

HEN Chief Justice Burger proposed creation of an "Intercircuit Panel" to assist the Supreme Court in deciding cases, he
repeatedly emphasized that his plan was a modest one. As he portrayed it, the new tribunal would represent only incremental
change, "nothing more than. . . a national en banc panel of nine
judges," and in any event "temporary and experimentally." 1 In an
Copyright 0 1986, Arthur D. Hellman.
of Law, University of Pittsburgh. B.A., 1963, Harvard College; J.D., 1966,
Yale University. Deputy Executive Director, Commission on Revision of the Federal Court
Appellate System, 1973-75.
1. Burger, The Time Is Now for the Intercircuit Panel, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1985, at 86, 88
[hereinafter cited as Burger, Intercircuit Panel]; see also Burger, Annual Report on the
State of the Judiciary,69 A.BA J. 442 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Burger, 1983 Annual
Report]. As will be seen, I do not agree with this characterization. See infra Part IV.
As initially described by the Chief Justice, the proposed court did not have a name. When
legislation was introduced in Congress to implement his plan, the proposed structure was
designated as the "Intercircuit Tribunal of the United States Courts of Appeals." S. 645,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 601-07 (1983), 129 CONG. REc. S1947-48 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1983)
(remarks of Sen. Dole); H.R. 1970, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), 129 CONG. REc. H1192-93
(daily ed. Mar. 15, 1983) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier). The bill now under consideration
in the Senate denominates the proposed court as the "Intercircuit Panel of the United
*Professor
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Article published in this issue of the Florida State University Law
Review, Justice William H. Rehnquist has articulated a far more
ambitious plan. Justice Rehnquist supports the proposed Intercircuit Panel, but not simply as an experiment. Rather, he sees it as
the first step in a radical restructuring of the federal judicial system-the establishment of a new court that "will have either by
practice or by statute the all-but-final say" on issues of statutory
construction.2
In arguing for the creation of this new court, Justice Rehnquist
relies on a straightforward syllogism. Constitutional adjudication is
more important than statutory adjudication; the Supreme Court
cannot resolve all of the undecided federal questions that arise in
both areas; therefore cases involving only statutory interpretation
should be shunted off to a new tribunal that would "function in
'3
effect as a lower chamber of the Supreme Court."
Justice Rehnquist deserves full credit for his candor in acknowledging that the proposed Intercircuit Panel does not involve simply a matter of judicial housekeeping, but implicates basic questions about "the proper role of the Supreme Court in our system of
government."" However, both his diagnosis and his prescription are
flawed in fundamental respects. First, the available evidence does
not support the proposition that "we need today more national decision-making capacity than the Supreme Court as presently constituted can furnish." 5 Second, Justice Rehnquist relies on a superficial description of the Supreme Court's role in the American
system of government. When the full measure of that role is taken
into account, it becomes apparent that eliminating statutory cases
from the Court's docket could seriously handicap the Court in the
performance of its essential responsibilities.
States Courts of Appeals." S. 704, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); see 130 CONG. REC. S3313
(daily ed. Mar. 20, 1985) (remarks of Sen. Thurmond). The current House bill continues to
use the "Intercircuit Tribunal" designation. H.R. 4238, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); see 132
CONG. REc. H650 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1986) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier).
2. Rehnquist, The Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 1, 12
(1986). Justice Rehnquist reiterated his views in comments from the floor during a discussion of the Intercircuit Panel proposal at the 1986 midyear meeting of the American Bar
Association. Notwithstanding Justice Rehnquist's plea, the House of Delegates rejected the
plan by a large margin. See Bar Group Opposes Plan to Establish New Appeals Court,
Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 1986, at 12, col. 3; American Bar Association Mid-Year Meeting, 54
U.S.L.W. 2414, 2415 (1986).
3. Rehnquist, supra note 2, at 12.
4. Id. at 1.
5. Id. at 12.
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I shall discuss each of these points in turn,' but before doing so
it will be useful to touch briefly on an aspect of the controversy
that Justice Rehnquist does not mention at all. Totally absent
from his analysis is any suggestion that the Supreme Court is overworked. What makes this so curious is that Chief Justice Burger,
whose Intercircuit Panel proposal Justice Rehnquist endorses, has
relied almost entirely on the argument that the Supreme Court's
caseload has become so burdensome as to threaten "a breakdown
of the system-or of some of the justices." 7 Consistent with this
perception of the problem, the Chief Justice contemplates that the
new panel would "take as many as 35 to 50 cases a year from the
argument calendar of the Supreme Court"' and thereby restore the
plenary docket "to some figure at or near the 100 argued cases'
that the Chief Justice believes to be "the maximum caseload that
should be carried by the Supreme Court." 10 Under this approach,
there would be no increase whatever in the "national decisionmaking capacity."
Justice Rehnquist's failure to say anything about the burdens
imposed by the Court's caseload is no oversight. In an earlier
speech endorsing the Chief Justice's proposal, Justice Rehnquist
explicitly disavowed the "overwork" argument. He stated that the
Supreme Court is busy, "but probably no busier than many other
courts and private practitioners."1 1 And he saw no reason for the
Court to cut back from the 150 cases that it now hears even if
"fifty or so cases" were being transferred to a new court for
decision.12
For reasons I have developed elsewhere, I do not think the evidence supports the Chief Justice's contention that the Supreme
6. The editors have asked me to write a brief commentary on Justice Rehnquist's proposal. Many of the issues raised by the plan are discussed at greater length in Hellman, The
Proposed Intercircuit Tribunal: Do We Need It? Will It Work?, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
375 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Hellman, Intercircuit Tribunal]; and Hellman, Caseload,
Conflicts, and Decisional Capacity:Does the Supreme Court Need Help?, 67 JUDICATURE 28
(1983).
Unless otherwise attributed, the data in this Article are based on my own research. Lists
of the cases included in the various categories are on file with the author.
7. Burger, 1983 Annual Report, supra note 1, at 445.
8. Id. at 447.
9. Id.
10. Burger, Intercircuit Tribunal, supra note 1, at 89.
11. Rehnquist, A Plea for Help: Solutions to Serious Problems Currently Experienced
by the Federal Judicial System, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1, 6 (1984).
12. Id.
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Court is overworked. 3 But because Justice Rehnquist does not rely
on the argument, I shall not pursue it here. The important point is
that the two Justices who have been most vocal in calling for the
creation of a "lower chamber" for the Supreme Court have given
different and largely inconsistent explanations of why a new tribunal is needed. Disagreement on a matter so fundamental suggests
at the outset that Congress should proceed with great caution
before implementing structural change, "experimentally" or otherwise, in the federal judicial system.
II.

ADEQUACY OF THE NATIONAL DECISIONAL CAPACITY

In arguing that "we need.

. .

more national decision-making ca-

pacity than the Supreme Court as presently constituted can furnish," Justice Rehnquist advances two propositions, one empirical,
the other normative. The empirical proposition is implied rather
than stated: the Supreme Court cannot resolve all of the intercircuit conflicts presented to it."' The normative proposition is put
more straightforwardly: definitive resolution of important federal
questions should not await the development of a conflict, but
should come at an earlier stage. Neither argument is persuasive.
On the empirical side, proving a negative is always difficult, and
never more so than when the question is one as elusive as whether
the Supreme Court is leaving conflicts unresolved because its
docket is too full. The difficulty is twofold. In all but the clearest
cases, reasonable people can disagree as to whether two rulings are
actually in conflict. 15 Even when the presence of a conflict is indisputable, six or more Justices may vote to deny review for a wide
variety of reasons other than the lack of decisional capacity. 6 Nevertheless, I think it is now possible to render something stronger
than a "not proven" verdict on the claim that numerous unresolved conflicts can be found in the cases the Court does not
hear. The reason is epitomized by one of Justice Rehnquist's favor17
ite literary allusions: the dog that did not bark in the nighttime.
13. See Hellman, Intercircuit Tribunal, supra note 6, at 380-92.
14. This is the implication of the discussion in Rehnquist, supra note 2, at 11-12.
15. For example, two decisions may be perceived as conflicting with one another if the
issue is defined in broad terms, but not if it is defined narrowly. See Hellman, Case Selection in the Burger Court: A PreliminaryInquiry, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 947, 1018-19
(1985); infra note 22 and accompanying text.
16. See Hellman, Intercircuit Tribunal, supra note 6, at 401-02. Under the "Rule of
Four," four votes are required to set a case for plenary consideration. See Hellman, supra
note 15, at 956-57.
17. See Harrison v. PPG Indus., 446 U.S. 578, 596 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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At least since 1974, prominent judges, lawyers, scholars, and legislators have been asserting that unresolved intercircuit conflicts
constitute a problem of significant magnitude.18 Yet in all that
time no one has been able to cite more than a handful of conflict
cases in which review has been denied. 9 Surely, if the problem
were as pervasive as supporters of the proposed new court assert, a
lengthy list of cases would have been forthcoming by now.
Within the Court, the most persistent advocate of the view that
intercircuit conflicts remain unresolved because the Court cannot
make room on its docket has been Justice White.20 A casual reader
of the Court's weekly order lists might get the impression that Justice White has identified a substantial number of cases in which
the Court denied review despite the presence of a conflict. But
careful counting reveals that in the four Terms 1981 through 1984
Justice White published no more than sixty opinions dissenting
from the denial of certiorari on that ground." In some of the cases,
18. See, e.g., Meador, A Comment on the Chief Justice's Proposals,69 A.B.A. J. 448, 449
(1983); Schaefer, Reducing Circuit Conflicts, 69 A.B.A. J. 452 (1983). See generally Hellman,
Intercircuit Tribunal, supra note 6, at 393.
19. In the early 1970's, the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System (Hruska Commission) sponsored "a major project to determine the extent to which the
Supreme Court [was] denying review despite the existence of a conflict." U.S. Comm'n on
Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys., Structure and Internal Procedures:Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 221 (1975). The study concluded that "when duplicate
issues, cases resolved at the time review [was] denied, and serious procedural problems
[were] taken into account," the number of conflicts denied review would come.to about 50
per year. Id. at 222. However, the Commission's report gave only a few examples of unresolved conflicts. See id. at 307-08, 321-24. Contemporary commentators questioned
whether the Commission had adequately supported its conclusion "that the Supreme Court
has been denying review of cases that truly present conflicts among the circuits." Alsup,
Reservations on the Proposalof the Hruska Commission to Establish a National Court of
Appeals, 7 U. TOL. L. REv. 431, 441 (1976). More recently, a re-examination of the cases
relied on by the Commission's study has cast further doubt on the prevalence of unresolved
conflicts in the early 1970's. Note, Identification, Tolerability, and Resolution of Intercircuit Conflicts: Reexamining Professor Feeney's Study of Conflicts in Federal Law, 59
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1007 (1984). And a study of all paid cases that were denied review in the 1982
Term found only 19 intercourt conflicts that the Court failed to resolve. Estreicher & Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court's Responsibilities: An Empirical Study,
59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 681, 778-79 (1984).
20. See, e.g., Brown Transp. Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 439 U.S. 1014 (1978) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
21. This figure does not include cases in which Justice White stated without explanation
that he would grant certiorari. Some of these cases appear to have presented intercourt
conflicts. See, e.g., State v. Caminita, 411 So. 2d 13 (La.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982)
(presenting issue later resolved in Mabry v. Johnson, 104 S.Ct. 2543 (1984)); Stoica v. Stewart, 672 F.2d 309 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982) (presenting issue later resolved
in Tower v. Glover, 104 S. Ct. 2820 (1984)). In a few additional cases, Justice White joined
an opinion in which another Justice stated that the Court was denying review despite the
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other members of the Court filed concurring opinions disputing
Justice White's contention that a conflict existed. 2 And several of
the issues flagged by Justice White were resolved by the grant of
review in subsequent cases.2
The upshot is that after more than ten years of debate over various national court proposals, there is almost no evidence to support the claim that the incidence of intercircuit conflicts has outgrown the capacity of the Supreme Court to resolve them. The
inference is strong that unresolved conflicts are not a problem of
24
great magnitude.
In this light, it is understandable that Justice Rehnquist places
little reliance on the argument that the Court does not have the
capacity to resolve all of the intercircuit conflicts that are
presented to it.2 5 Instead, he puts forth a more interventionist conpresence of a conflict. See, e.g., Brown v. Chaney, 105 S. Ct. 601, 605 (1984) (Burger, C.J.,
joined by White & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
22. See, e.g., Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Illinois, 459 U.S. 1049 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in the denial of certiorari). Compare also Green Bay Packaging, Inc. v. Adams
Extract Co., 105 S. Ct. 3536 (1985) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (asserting
that decision of court below conflicted with a Fourth Circuit decision) with In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litigation, 752 F.2d 137, 142 (5th Cir. 1985) (decision below) ("Even if
the Fourth Circuit doctrine is sound, the rationale of its holding is not applicable here and
its dicta approves [sic] the course we take.").
23. Compare Williford v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 270 (1984) (White, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari), with United States v. Rojas-Contreras, 106 S. Ct. 555 (1985); compare
Jackson v. City of Joliet, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), with Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662, 664 (1986); compare Romero v. United States,
459 U.S. 926 (1982) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), with Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); compare Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S.
997 (1982) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), with NLRB v. Transportation
Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983); compare Baxter v. Mouzavires, 455 U.S. 1006
(1982) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), and Chelsea House Publishers v.
Nicholstone Book Bindery, Inc., 455 U.S. 994 (1982) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari), with Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985); compare Kimble v.
D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 454 U.S. 1110 (1981) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari),
with Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (1983); see also Schiavone v. Fortune, 750 F.2d 15 (3d
Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 56 (1985) (apparently granting review to resolve issue
discussed in Cooper v. United States Postal Serv., 105 S. Ct. 2034, 2036 (1985) (White J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
A disproportionate number of Justice White's dissents were issued in the 1984 Term, the
most recent of the four in the study; thus very little time has elapsed in which the issues
might have returned to the Court. Cf. Hellman, Error Correction, Lawmaking, and the Supreme Court's Exercise of Discretionary Review, 44 U. Prrr. L. REv. 795, 868 n.372 (1983)

(noting resolution of conflicts identified by Justice White in earlier Terms); Hellman, Intercircuit Tribunal, supra note 6, at 396 n.100 (same).

24. For further discussion of this point, see Hellman, Intercircuit Tribunal, supra note
6, at 393-402.
25. Consistent with this approach, Justice Rehnquist joined only seven of the opinions in
which Justice White dissented from the denial of certiorari on the ground that the Court
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ception of the Court's role as ultimate arbiter of the meaning of
the federal Constitution and laws. He rejects the premise that the
Court should await the development of a conflict before resolving
"an important and undecided federal question." 6 And he denies
the value of "percolation," implying that "definitive" answers to
recurring issues should be rendered at the earliest possible

moment. 27
These propositions are best considered in reverse order, but
before turning to that task, I shall address another empirical matter raised by Justice Rehnquist's line of argument: the role of intercircuit conflicts in the case selection process today.2 8 As Justice
Rehnquist no doubt recognizes, it would be a substantial exaggeration to suggest that "only when there is a 'conflict' between two
courts of appeals on an important and undecided federal question"
the 602 appeal and certiorari
does the Court grant review. 29 Of th
cases that reached the plenary docket in the four Terms 1981
through 1984,30 little more than one-third involved intercircuit
conflicts. 31 Even on issues of general federal law and the jurisdiction and procedure of federal courts, where the conflict resolution
function looms largest in the selection process,3 2 conflicts accounted for only half of the grants of review. Cases of first impression can be found among the plenary decisions;3 3 so can cases in
which the party who sought review did not even attempt to show
34
that issues of general importance were at stake.
In short, it is true that the Court often will wait for the development of a conflict before resolving a recurring issue. And in some
areas of statutory law, the plenary docket is overwhelmingly dominated by conflict cases. But when we look at the docket as a whole,
was failing to resolve an intercourt conflict.
26. Rehnquist, supra note 2, at 10.
27. Id. at 11.
28. For a more elaborate discussion of this topic, see Hellman, supra note 15, at 1014-20.
29. Justice Rehnquist does not quite assert that this is now the Court's practice; he does
say that this is the approach that lawyers have been conditioned to expect from the Court.
See Rehnquist, supra note 2, at 10.
30. Here and elsewhere in this Article, two or more cases consolidated for argument and
decision have been counted as a single case. See Hellman, supra note 15, at 952-53. The
figure in the text excludes 10 original-jurisdiction cases that received plenary consideration
during the four Terms.
31. The criteria for identifying conflict cases are described in Hellman, supra note 15, at
1015.
32. See id. at 1016, 1041-42.
33. See id. at 1030-33.
34. See id. at 1035-41.
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we find that a substantial majority of the cases have received plenary consideration for other reasons and in the absence of a conflict. Thus, not only does the evidence refute the contention that
the Supreme Court cannot resolve all of the conflicts presented to
it; it also negates the proposition that the Court can intervene only
to resolve conflicts. The effect is to further undercut the argument
that the "national decision-making capacity" is inadequate.
If the argument is to succeed, then, it must be through redefining the lawmaking role of the Supreme Court. Justice Rehnquist
essays this task with characteristic zeal, and he does so primarily
by denigrating the value of percolation.
This line of attack comes as something of a surprise. Only two
years ago, in an opinion for a unanimous Court, Justice Rehnquist
spoke approvingly of "the benefit [the Supreme Court] receives
from permitting several courts of appeals to explore a difficult
question before this Court grants certiorari.

35

Justice Rehnquist

now rejects this position on the ground that courts in performing
their lawmaking function "are not engaged in a scientific experiment.""6 He argues, in essence, that because problems of statutory
interpretation have "no obviously 'correct' solution," there is no
value in testing the soundness of the various possible approaches
37
before imposing one of them as the "definitive" answer.
This is a non sequitur. The argument might be persuasive-in
practical terms if not as a matter of logic-if we could assume that
Congress would generally act quickly to correct an improvident or
less-than-optimal interpretation of a statute. But that assumption
would fly in the face of reality. 8 And if lawyers, litigants, and people who must act in accordance with federal law will have to live
indefinitely with the construction of a statute given by the court of
last resort, surely it makes sense for that court to defer a definitive
judgment until some "hypothetical and tentative answer[s]" have
been tested in the crucible of litigation. 9
No great effort is required to find cases in which the Supreme
Court's task has been made easier by the work of lower courts in
35. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984).
36. Rehnquist, supra note 2, at 11.
37. Id.
38. See Hellman, The Supreme Court and Statutory Law: The Plenary Docket in the
1970's, 40 U. PiTT. L. REV. 1, 38 (1978); see also G. CALABREsi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE
OF STATUTES 6 (1982).
39. See Rehnquist, supra note 2, at 11. For further discussion of the benefits of percolation, see Hellman, Intercircuit Tribunal, supra note 6, at 404-06.
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analyzing the issues and considering possible solutions. For example, in 1981 leading commentators pointed out that "[t]here has
been considerable controversy over the question of the res judicata
effect to be accorded a state court decision in a subsequent federal
court action under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983."40 They suggested that the
full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, ought to be "[a]
starting point for analysis in such cases," but acknowledged that
"many of the judicial discussions of the problem" had failed to recognize this fact.4 ' Although several cases raising the issue were
brought to the Supreme Court,4' none were heard until the 1983
Term. The Court then resolved the question in a brief opinion,
joined by all nine Justices, that relied primarily on section 1738. 41
It is highly unlikely that the controversy would have been dealt
with so easily and with such unanimity if the Court had addressed
the issue in one of the earlier cases, before the significance of section 1738 had crystallized.
Apart from rejecting the value of percolation, Justice Rehnquist
does not explicitly define what makes a case appropriate for consideration by the Supreme Court. However, he implies that review
by a national tribunal should be available whenever the petitioner
"raises [an] important federal question[] not foreclosed by any decision of [the Supreme] Court. '4 5 If this standard were applied literally, it would mean that the Court should grant review in many
cases where the gain in certainty and predictability from a Supreme Court decision would be minimal. For example, in the 1984
Term the Court denied certiorari to a petition presenting the ques40. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

& H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FED243 (1981 Supp.) [hereinafter cited as HART &

WECHSLER).

41.

Id. at 244.

42. See, e.g., Castorr v. Brundage, 459 U.S. 928, 930-31 (1982) (White, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari); New Jersey Educ. Ass'n v. Burke, 579 F.2d 764 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 894 (1978) (discussed in Brown Transp. Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 439 U.S. 1014,
1019 (1978) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
43. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984).
44. For other cases in which much-debated issues proved surprisingly easy when the
Court finally addressed them, see Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985)
(8-1 decision) (validity of "sale of business" doctrine in securities regulation), discussed in
Hellman, Intercircuit Tribunal, supra note 6, at 405 n.132; Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1938
(1985) (7-1 decision) (selection of appropriate state statute of limitations in actions under
1871 Civil Rights Act); Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S. Ct. 3138 (1984) (unanimous decision)
(applicability of Miranda ruling to interrogations involving minor traffic offenses); NLRB v.
Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983) (unanimous decision) (allocation of
burden of proof in unfair labor practice cases).
45. Rehnquist, supra note 2, at 10.

24

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:15

tion whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits

employment discrimination against transsexuals."' The question
was important, in the sense that it had been litigated in numerous
cases, and the result certainly was not foreclosed by any existing
Supreme Court decision. But every court of appeals to consider the
issue (and most of the district courts) agreed that if transsexuals
were to be protected by the civil rights law, "the new definition
must come from Congress."4 How much would a Supreme Court
ruling have added to the ability of lawyers and litigants to know
48
what the law is on that subject?
I do not disagree with Justice Rehnquist's premise that uniformity and predictability in federal law are important goals of the judicial system. But as I have argued more fully elsewhere, decisions
by a national court are likely to advance those goals in a substantial way only when the issues they resolve are doubtful, recurring,
and discrete.4 9 In a common law legal system, issues of that kind
are the exception rather than the rule.
Beyond this, it cannot be assumed that a larger number of Supreme Court decisions in any given area of the law will necessarily
make for greater certainty and predictability. Over the last decade,
no area of legal dispute has received more consistent or more sustained attention from the Supreme Court than the fourth amendment. In the eight Terms 1977 through 1984, the Court handed
down sixty-six decisions on the law of search and seizure-more
(by one case) than were devoted to any other specific constitutional guarantee, including the free speech clause of the first
amendment. Yet the law of search and seizure remains one of the
46. Ulane v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 2023 (1985).
47. Id. at 1087.
48. For additional illustrations of this pattern, see United States v. Appoloney, 761 F.2d
520, 523 (9th Cir.) (joining other circuits that have "uniformly" rejected fifth amendment
challenges to the new federal law requiring wagering tax returns), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
348 (1985); Germantown Hosp. & Medical Center v. Heckler, 738 F.2d 631, 633 (3d Cir.
1984) ("The specific constitutional objections raised by appellants in the cases before us
now have been . . . uniformly rejected by" all four circuits that have considered them.),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 906 (1985); Mid-America Nat'l Bank v. First Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 737
F.2d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding no implied private right of action under National
Flood Insurance Program; noting that "[p]laintiffs do not cite nor does our research disclose
any reported decision not overruled that reaches a contrary result."), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
911 (1985). See also Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 54 U.S.L.W. 4208, 4211 n.6
(U.S. Feb. 26, 1986) (unanimous affirmance in appeal from three-judge district court) (upholding constitutionality of federal pension statute amendments; noting that decision below
was "consistent with the result reached by every other court to have considered the issue").
49. See Hellman, Intercircuit Tribunal, supra note 6, at 407-13.
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most confused and contradictory areas of constitutional adjudication. Doctrines have proliferated to the point where the legality of
almost any warrantless search arguably will be controlled by two,
three, or even more lines of precedent.50
Perhaps there is some pathology about the fourth amendment
that has created this unhealthy state of affairs.51 But the fact remains that the one area in which there is no shortage of nationally
binding precedents is one in which there is tremendous confusion
and uncertainty.2' Unless Justice Rehnquist can explain why this
phenomenon is not representative, it would be foolish indeed to
create a new structure that would expand the national decisional
capacity and thus permit the replication of the fourth amendment
53
quagmire in other areas of the law.

It is possible that I have misunderstood the thrust of Justice
Rehnquist's position; regrettably, he provides no examples of important questions of federal law that have remained unresolved because the Court could not make room on its docket.54 But we need
50. See, e.g., United States v. Owens, 782 F.2d 146 (10th Cir. 1986) (rejecting, seriatim,
government's arguments that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
motel room; that search was justified by "consent" of motel manager; that search fell within
"protective sweep exception" to warrant requirement; that "good faith" exception to exclusionary rule applied; and that contraband could be admitted into evidence under "inevitable
discovery" exception to exclusionary rule); Sharpe v. United States, 660 F.2d 967 (4th Cir.
1981), vacated, 457 U.S. 1127 (1982) (remand for reconsideration in light of intervening
Supreme Court decision), on remand, 712 F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1983) (disavowing one holding,
but readopting prior opinion with modifications), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1568 (1985); People v.
Carney, 668 P.2d 807 (Cal. 1983)(holding that motor home should be treated as a home for
fourth amendment purposes; rejecting applicability of "automobile exception"), rev'd, 105 S.
Ct. 2066 (1985) (holding that "automobile exception" applies); Castleberry v. State, 678
P.2d 720 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984) (holding search invalid under "container" precedents; rejecting applicability of vehicle search precedents), aff'd mem., 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985)
(equally divided Court).
51. See Hellman, supra note 15, at 1009-10.
52. Another area in which the Court has been extremely active in recent years is that of
Indian law. See Hellman, The Supreme Court, the National Law, and the Selection of
Cases for the Plenary Docket, 44 U. Prrr. L. REv. 521, 593, 619 (1983). Yet a prominent
commentator, surveying the Court's work on the important topic of governmental authority
over reservation activities of non-Indians, found that the plethora of rulings had not
brought greater certainty and predictability; instead, "[ejach new decision . . . seem[ed] to
turn on finer points and to raise more questions." Pelcyger, Justices and Indians: Back to
Basics, 62 OR. L. REV. 29, 29-30 (1983).
53. I acknowledge that frequent involvement with a particular area of the law can benefit the Court's decision-making processes. See Hellman, The Business of the Supreme Court
Under the Judiciary Act of 1925: The Plenary Docket in the 1970's, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1709,
1796 n.305 (1978). However, as the search and seizure cases illustrate, this kind of exposure
does not necessarily lead to greater clarity or certainty in the law.
54. Justice Rehnquist does refer in passing to "lawyers and litigants. . . [who] are seeking to know . . . the meaning of a particular subsection of the Internal Revenue Code."
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not rely wholly on speculation or read between the lines of his article to identify the kinds of cases he has in mind. To give flesh to
Justice Rehnquist's abstract formulations, we can look at his dissents from the denial of certiorari.
During the last eight Terms, Justice Rehnquist has published a
dissenting opinion or notation in more than 120 cases in which the
Court denied review. By far the largest number of these-more
than half the total-consisted of civil rights cases in which the
55
lower court had ruled in favor of the constitutional claimant.
This is a class of cases that already enjoys extraordinary favor with
the present Court; more than one-fourth of all such petitions are
granted, compared with one-twentieth of all petitions that are
filed. 56
In short, Justice Rehnquist appears to be arguing that we should
make a radical change in the structure of the federal judicial system so that the Supreme Court can consider a larger number of
Rehnquist, supra note 2, at 11. It is thus relevant to note that in the eight Terms 1977
through 1984, Justice Rehnquist dissented only once from the Court's refusal to consider an
issue of this kind. See Prince Edward School Found. v. United States, 450 U.S. 944, 944
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that Court should decide
"whether the Internal Revenue Service is entitled to deny tax-exempt status to a private
school which discriminates in its admissions policy."). In another tax case, three Justices
published a dissent arguing that the petitioner-taxpayer had presented an issue "of sufficient importance in the administration of the income tax laws to justify review [by the Supreme Court];" however, Justice Rehnquist declined to provide the fourth vote that would
have placed the case on the plenary docket. See Singleton v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 940,
940 (1978) (Blackmun, J., joined by Marshall & Powell, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari). The same phenomenon occurred twice in the 1985 Term. See Mellon Bank v. United
States, 54 U.S.L.W. 3559 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1986) (O'Connor, J., joined by Blackmun & Powell,
JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that lower courts' construction of the Internal Revenue Code "will have a significant impact on the financial vitality of [certain
charitable] organizations"); Bonner v. Commissioner, 106 S. Ct. 258, 259 (1985) (O'Connor,
J., joined by Blackmun & Powell, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("seriously question[ing] whether the harsh result reached by the Court of Appeals is consistent with either
the letter or intent of the relevant provisions of the [Internal Revenue] Code"); see also
West Central Coop. v. United States, 758 F.2d 1269 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 375
(1985) (three Justices, not including Justice Rehnquist, noted that they would grant review
in tax case). For further discussion, see infra note 57.
55. "Civil rights cases" are defined in Hellman, The Supreme Court and Civil Rights:
The Plenary Docket in the 1970's, 58 OR. L. REV. 3, 4-6 (1979).
During the same eight Terms, Chief Justice Burger dissented from the denial of review in
more than sixty cases. All but a dozen or so were civil rights cases in which the lower court
had ruled in favor of the constitutional claimant.
56. In the four Terms 1981 through 1984, the Court received about 750 applications for
review in civil rights cases in which the court below had ruled in favor of the constitutional
claimant. Nearly 200 of these received plenary consideration. Another 25 were summarily
reversed, and about 80 were summarily vacated for reconsideration in light of an intervening
Supreme Court decision.
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cases in which lower courts have found merit in a civil liberties
claim.57 Even those who are most alarmed by perceived excesses of
judicial activism might well question whether such a drastic remedy is necessary.5
III.

THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

Notwithstanding what I have just said, there is a strong intuitive
appeal to the proposition that given the vastly expanded role of
federal law in the American legal system and the proliferation of
litigation in state and federal courts, one Court of nine Justices
cannot possibly resolve all of the doubtful recurring federal questions that arise in those courts. And if Justice Rehnquist's proposal
for increased decision-making capacity could be implemented with
little or no risk to other values, opposition would indeed appear to
rest on an unthinking attachment to old ways. In my view, however, remitting statutory issues to a new court would interfere significantly with the Supreme Court's ability to perform its most important functions in the legal system.
57. In further support of this characterization, I note that the tax decisions discussed
supra note 54 exemplify a broader pattern in Justice Rehnquist's votes on applications for
plenary hearing. For example, of the 60 or so cases in which Justice White asserted that the
Court was denying review despite the presence of a conflict, see supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text, more than one-quarter would have reached the plenary docket if Justice
Rehnquist had provided a fourth vote for the grant of certiorari. See, e.g., Cooper v. United
States, 105 S. Ct. 2664 (1985) (White, J., joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (interpretation of federal criminal statute); Mordaunt v. Incomco, 105 S.
Ct. 801 (1985) (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., & Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (interpretation of federal securities laws); Taliaferro v. Maryland, 461 U.S. 948
(1983) (White, J., joined by Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(interpretation of compulsory process clause of sixth amendment). In only one of the cases
had the lower court upheld a civil rights claim. See Novack Inv. Co. v. Setser, 454 U.S. 1064
(1981) (White, J., joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(right to jury trial in action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
58. 1 use the term "activist" in the sense suggested by Judge Posner: an activist decision
is one that augments the power of courts vis-a-vis other institutions of government. See R.
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 208-11 (1985). From this perspective, any
decision sustaining a constitutional challenge to action by state or federal governments
would be regarded as activist. A decision could be deemed "excessive" if it invalidates governmental conduct that is arguably permissible under existing precedent.
It is plausible to speculate that the flow of activist decisions from the lower federal courts
will diminish as appointees of President Reagan come to occupy an ever-larger proportion of
the judgeships. If so, Justice Rehnquist may begin to find a smaller number of cases requiring resolution at the national level. But see, e.g., American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771
F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.) (ordinance that defines "pornography" as
"graphic sexually explicit subordination of women" violates first amendment), aff'd mem.,
54 U.S.L.W. 3560 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1986) (Burger, C.J., Rehnquist, J., & O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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Justice Rehnquist starts off on a sound footing by recognizing
that the desirability of his proposal will depend ultimately on one's
"concept of the proper role of the Supreme Court in our system of
government. 6' 9 And few would disagree with his premise that the
Court's role in constitutional adjudication is more important to the
country than its role in statutory adjudication. 0 Unfortunately,
Justice Rehnquist goes no further in defining the Court's role in
the decision of constitutional questions.
The cases that invoke the Court's constitutional function are, of
course, a varied lot. Most often the Court is called upon to adjudicate claims based on the Bill of Rights, the fourteenth amendment,
and other constitutional provisions that protect individual rights
against government action. But some of the cases involve the allocation of powers between state and national governments. A distinction can also be drawn between the supremacy function, embracing cases in which an exercise of state power is challenged on
the ground of repugnance to federal law, and the checking function, encompassing review of actions by other branches of the national government. Cases from state courts may implicate different
aspects of the Court's role than do cases from federal courts, and
those implications in turn may depend on whether the court below
accepted or rejected the constitutional claim.61 But the common
thread that runs through all of these cases is that the litigant invoking the Constitution is asking the Court to overturn action
taken or supported by the executive or legislative branches of government. In other words, "constitutional adjudication" means judicial review; and judicial review, in the phrase made familiar by the
late Alexander M. Bickel, is counter-majoritarian 2 Thus, if Justice Rehnquist's proposal were to be adopted, nearly every case on
the plenary docket would require the Court to second-guess decisions by the representative branches of government.
This arrangement would have several consequences for the
Court's performance of its constitutional functions.6 " First and
59.
60.
61.

Rehnquist, supra note 2, at 1.
Id. at 14.
See Helman, supra note 15, at 1036-41.

62.

See A.

BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS

BRANCH

16 (1962); Kronman, Alexander

Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567, 1573-79 (1985).
63. Justice Rehnquist does not actually suggest that the Supreme Court give up all responsibility for statutory interpretation; rather, he anticipates that the Court would "largely
relinquish its role in run-of-the-mine statutory construction cases." Rehnquist, supra note
2, at 12 (emphasis added). I surmise that the purpose of this limitation is to exclude most
cases arising under statutes like the 1871 Civil Rights Act or the Sherman Antitrust
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most important, the elimination of statutory cases from the

Court's docket would pose dangers for the way in which the
Court's work is perceived by legislators and other citizens. Judicial
review is difficult to defend under the best of circumstances, but
supporters of the institution as we know it today can emphasize
that the Constitution is, after all, law, and that the Court provides
authoritative interpretations of the Constitution just as it does for
other kinds of laws." If the Court were to decide only constitutional cases, that analogy would be gone. To the popular eye, the
Court would be nullifying decisions by the representative branches
of government, not "as a correlative of [its] dual duty to decide
those cases over which [it has] jurisdiction and to apply the federal
Constitution as one source of the.

. .

governing legal rules,"65 but

as a "superlegislature" very much like the Council of Revision rejected by the Framers. 6
This perception would be reinforced by the heightened degree of
divisiveness that could be expected within the Court. Of the constitutional decisions issued in the last four Terms, nearly half drew
at least three dissenting votes, and little more than one-fourth
were unanimous in result. In contrast, only one-third of the statutory decisions generated three or four dissenting votes; nearly half
were unanimous. Even when the Justices were able to agree on the
result in a constitutional case, their harmony often turned to discord when they attempted to articulate a rationale. For example,
more than 250 civil rights cases were decided on the merits in the
four Terms 1981 through 1984, but there were not even forty in
which all participating Justices joined in a single opinion. On the
other hand, among the 200 or so statutory decisions, more than
seventy fit this description. It is relevant, too, that constitutional
issues, including questions of federalism and separation of powers,
Act-statutes that have the breadth of a constitutional provision and offer almost as much
latitude for judicial policymaking. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 93 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-88
(1978). In any event, the analysis in the text remains valid. See infra note 72.
64. See, e.g., D. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT. THE FIRST HUNDRED
YEARS, 1787-1888, at xii (1985).
65. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 678-79 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
66. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 40, at 7-8.
67. Even in those cases, it was not uncommon for members of the Court to file separate
opinions expressing additional views or explaining their interpretation of the majority opinion. See, e.g., McDonald v. Smith, 105 S. Ct. 2787, 2791 (1985) (concurring opinion by Brennan, J., joined by Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.); California v. Trombetta, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 2535
(1984) (concurring opinion by O'Connor, J.).
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accounted for all but two of the twenty-four cases that were decided by plurality opinions during this period.
From the standpoint of public perceptions, the effect of removing statutory cases from the Court's docket might be even worse
than these figures suggest. The reason is that voting blocs within
the Court tend to persist across a wide range of constitutional issues, but often break up when less earth-shaking questions of statutory interpretation are presented.' 8 The existence of cases in
which the Court finds itself unified-or divided along unexpected
lines-thus serves to moderate the tensions that are likely to build
up in cases involving the Bill of Rights, the fourteenth amendment, and the division of powers between state and national governments. Conversely, the loss of routine statutory issues could be
expected to intensify and make more bitter the divisions that do
exist among the Justices. Even today, "[t]he printed abuse of colleagues" 6 has become a common feature of Supreme Court opinions. If the Justices were disagreeing more often, and generally dividing along the same lines, the rhetoric would likely become even
more shrill and intemperate. And because, as Judge Richard Posner puts it, "[a]buse in opinions.

. .

lowers the reputation of the

judiciary in the eyes of the public (the small public that reads
opinions, the bigger public that reads newspaper accounts of opinions), ' 1 70 the legitimacy of the Court's counter-majoritarian deci-

sions would be placed even more at risk.
Finally, the Court would lose an important source of self-discipline if it were able to shunt routine statutory cases to a "lower
chamber." When the Justices consider a constitutional issue, they
are guided only by the broad, even cryptic, language of the constitutional text and by the Court's own precedents. In contrast, when
the Court decides cases under statutes like the Clean Air Act, the
Truth in Lending Act, or the Internal Revenue Code, it must work
within the confines of detailed and specific statutory language, and
often other legislative materials as well. These cases serve two important functions within the Court. They assure the continued involvement of the Justices in the traditions of the lawyer's craft,
68. For example, in the four Terms 1981 through 1984 the Court divided 5-4 in more
than fifty civil rights cases and about forty cases involving matters of statutory law. Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Brennan took opposing positions in all but one of the civil rights
cases, see Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), but they found themselves on the
same side in eight cases where issues of statutory law were involved.
69. R. POSNER, supra note 58, at 233.
70. Id.

1986]

RESPONSE TO REHNQUIST

and they remind the members of the Court that the Constitution is
not the only source of values, and that the decisions of the representative branches of government are entitled to respect.
Some people think that the Court has been rather "activist" over
the last two or three decades. Perhaps it has. But it has at least
had the anchor to conventional adjudication that comes from having to consider, in each argument session, a few cases of a more
obviously and traditionally "legal" nature. That anchor would be
gone if all or most of the routine statutory cases were routed to an
auxiliary tribunal. In the words of Judge Ralph K. Winter,
[T]he Court [would] be even more free to turn from the judicial
role of dispute settler to that of philosopher king. The transformation of the Supreme Court from a court of general jurisdiction
with general responsibility for reviewing the work of the lower
federal courts to a court free to seek out new areas in which to
make major policy declarations [would] . . . almost surely accel-

erate the expansion of judicial power and the trend toward the
constitutionalization of every perceived problem. In the end, the
Court [would] do as much work and decide about as many cases
as it does now but [would] exert even less self-discipline
with re71
gard to the kind of judge-made law it creates.
Of course, it is possible that these fears are exaggerated. 72 And if
the Court's role in constitutional adjudication were secure and
largely unquestioned, there might be little risk in an "experiment"
that would allow the Court gradually to throw off some of its re71. R. Winter, Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Courts [of the] Comm. on the Judiciary [of the] United States Senate 8 (Oct. 9, 1985) (to be printed in the record of hearings on
S. 704, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)). Curiously, Justice Rehnquist himself made the same
point more than a decade ago. Rehnquist, Whither the Courts, 60 A.B.A. J. 787, 790 (1974)
("To the extent that the Court must deal with statutory and other nonconstitutional ques-

tions, in which the permissible limits of adjudication are narrower, the

... Court is kept on

its toes and pressed to remain a classical court rather than a branch of government largely

freed from the necessity for giving closely reasoned explanations for what it does."). Principally for that reason, he concluded that to assign the Supreme Court's statutory interpretation function to a separate tribunal would be a "signal mistake." Id.
72. The analysis in the text posits an arrangement under which the Supreme Court
would refer all statutory cases to its "lower chamber." Under Justice Rehnquist's plan, the
Court might continue to decide some cases involving statutory interpretation, but almost
inevitably these would be precisely the cases that most clearly implicated policy considerations or required a choice between values. See supra note 63. While cases of this kind would
not ostensibly call upon the Court to second-guess majoritarian determinations, but see
Kronman, supra note 62, at 1574 n.36, the potential for divisiveness and the freedom from
externally imposed constraints would be almost as great as they are in constitutional
adjudication.
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sponsibilities in the realm of statutory interpretation. But we live
in an era when judicial review is being attacked on many fronts.
The Court's decisions on school prayer, busing, and abortion have
aroused passionate opposition from large and vocal segments of the
public. Politicians and religious leaders have denounced the
Court's rulings as not only erroneous but illegitimate. The Attorney General of the United States has publicly stated that "[flar
too many of the Court's opinions . . . have been more policy
'T
choices than articulations of long-term constitutional principle." 7
Respected scholars have joined in the condemnation of judicial
activism. 4
Under these circumstances, only the clearest showing that the
present system is inadequate would justify structural change that
might weaken the constraints on the Court's constitutional decision-making or undercut the legitimacy of its constitutional rulings. No such showing has been made.
IV. CONCLUSION
Three years have now passed since Chief Justice Burger revived
the national court debate by urging Congress to create a "temporary, experimental" Intercircuit Panel of the United States Courts
of Appeals. During that time, subcommittees in the House and
Senate have held numerous hearings on the Chief Justice's proposal. But the witnesses at those hearings have concentrated largely
on such matters as who should appoint the judges of the panel,
how long the judges should serve, and whether there should be a
requirement that each circuit be represented among the membership. Justice Rehnquist has now reminded us that these questions
are premature. Before we start thinking about the mechanics of a
plan to assist the Supreme Court in performing its essential role in
our system of government, we must first have a clear idea of what
that role is.
From a jurisprudential standpoint, the Court's function is to
provide authoritative resolution of recurring issues of federal law.
73. Meese, In Bar Group Speech, Criticizes High Court, N.Y. Times, July 10, 1985, at
A13, col. 1. See also Reagan Seeks Judges with "TraditionalApproach": Interview with
Edwin Meese, Attorney General of the United States, U.S. NEws & WORLD R"i., Oct. 14,
1985, at 67 (Supreme Court's abortion ruling "usurped . . . a legislative function").
74. See, e.g., Graglia, The Power of Congress to Limit Supreme Court Jurisdiction,7
HARV. J.L. & Pus. POL'Y 23, 23 (1984) (quoting Prof. Kurland) (" '[T]he most immediate
constitutional crisis' of our time is 'the usurpation by the judiciary of general government on
the pretext that its authority derives from the Fourteenth Amendment.' ").
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Within the realm of federal law, decisions involving constitutional
interpretation enjoy a special status, a status that derives ultimately from the delicate and remarkable institution of judicial review. Justice Rehnquist properly emphasizes that both aspects of
the Court's role-the horizontal and the vertical, as it were-must
be kept in mind as we examine proposals for structural change.
U.-iderlying this approach is a recognition that the proposal now
before Congress does not involve merely a routine redistribution of
cases among federal courts, but rather a fundamental alteration in
the operation of the national legal order. If the legislation is enacted, the power to establish nationally binding precedents, now
exercised by the Supreme Court alone, would be shared with a new
tribunal. And lawyers and judges who now must reconcile authoritative precedents from two levels75of courts would have a third set
of decisions to take into account.
Unfortunately, when Justice Rehnquist turns from the general to
the particular, his analysis falters. He suggests unpersuasively that
every "important" question of federal law should be resolved by a
national court. He denigrates the process of percolation that so
often has eased the Court's task in formulating a definitive answer
to a recurring problem. And although he acknowledges the primacy
of the Court's constitutional role, he ignores the probable effects
on the Court's ability to perform that role effectively if constitutional adjudication were its only responsibility.
The most telling rebuttal to Justice Rehnquist, however, may
come from the supposed victims of the malady he diagnoses in the
federal judicial system. Having sensibly disclaimed the contention
that the Supreme Court is overburdened, Justice Rehnquist relies
entirely on the argument that the Court no longer has the capacity
to resolve all of the questions of federal law that require decision
at the national level. But if this were so, we would expect to hear
outcries of dissatisfaction from lawyers and judges who now experience frequent frustration in their efforts to discover what the law
is. Instead, the organized bar, after listening to Justice Rehnquist,
voted by a large margin to reject the proposed new court. 6 And
75. See Hellman, Intercircuit Tribunal, supra note 6, at 419-22.
76. See supra note 2. Chief Justice Burger, criticizing the bar association for voting
against his proposal, said that "the House of Delegates. . . is really not qualified to analyze
or pass on that question in 30 or 40 minutes." Burger Argues for New Court, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 18, 1986, at B9, col. 1. In fact, the debate went on for about 90 minutes, and the
delegates had previously been furnished with reports and recommendations from ABA committees that discussed the merits of the proposal.
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the vast majority of judges who have written or spoken about the
Intercircuit Panel idea have strongly opposed the plan."
What Justice Rehnquist proposes, then, is a drastic restructuring
of the federal court system that would threaten the institution of
judicial review in order to provide more nationally binding decisions for people who are quite satisfied with the flow of precedents
they now receive. Perhaps anticipating that this might be regarded
as a bad bargain, Justice Rehnquist invokes the words of Tennyson
as a warning against blind adherence to the "old order." Less poetic, but more apt, would be the familiar saying of folk wisdom: if
it ain't broke, don't fix it.

In the aftermath of the delegates' vote, a representative of the ABA wrote to a House
Judiciary subcommittee stating that "[affter extensive debate the Association voted . . . to
adopt the policy opposing the creation of an intercircuit panel." Among other arguments,
the ABA emphasized that "the need to create an intercircuit panel has not been sufficiently
demonstrated." Letter from Robert D. Evans, Director of the Governmental Affairs Group,
American Bar Association, to Rep. Kastenmeier (Feb. 20, 1986) (submitted for inclusion in
the record of hearings on H.R. 4238, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)).
77. For example, at hearings held by a Senate subcommittee in October 1985, three
judges of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit testified against the
Intercircuit Panel proposal; none spoke in favor. Judge Winter of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, also opposing the plan, noted that in 1983 the active judges
of his court had "expressed by a formal vote their unanimous opposition to similar legislation then pending before the Congress." R. Winter, supra note 71, at 1. Only one judge
testified in favor of the legislation.
At the ABA meeting in February 1986, see supra notes 2 & 76, opposition to the Intercircuit Panel was led by the Appellate Judges Conference. See L.A. Daily Leg. J., Feb. 12,
1986, at 1, col. 2.

